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In Connecticut, under a statute permitting the state to take ap-
peals upon all questions of law arising on the trial of criminal
cases in the same manner and to the same effect as if taken by
the accused, it is held that the state, even after an acquittal, is
authorized to appeal and, in case of reversal, to bring the de-
fendant again into court for a new trial.' In Minnesota, the
state is not permitted to appeal or seek a review in a criminal
case at any time or under any circumstances even on a point of
law arising prior to trial, though the trial judge certify the point
to the upper court for decision and the defendant consent to the
certification.2
At a time when the whole subject of criminal law is so much
under discussion and the inadequacy of criminal procedure is
being particularly decried, the remarkable contrast presented by
the laws of these two states deserves attention. Is it proper, on
the one hand, that the state should be allowed to carry the man
accused of crime to a court of last resort and perhaps back again
to the lower court for a new trial after a jury of his peers has de-
clared him innocent? Is it necessary, on the other hand, that the
state should be required to acquiesce in a standard of law, pro-
nounced and interpreted exclusively by trial judges, while private
litigants in its courts have a right to be heard by an appellate
tribunal, and while in other respects the state is regarded as a
preferred party against which action cannot be brought except
by its consent?
It would be natural to suppose that the diverse procedures used
in Connecticut and Minnesota had been adopted only after pro-
found deliberation. As a matter of fact, it cannot fairly be said
that the question has been considered on its merits in Minnesota,
either by the courts or by the legislature. The statutory provi-
sions in that state relating to appeals and writs of error in
criminal cases speak solely in terms of removal by the defendant. 3
The section relating to certification of the case to the supreme
court for determination of a question of law 4 is indefinite and
I Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) § 6648; State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 30 Atl.
1110 (1894).
2 State v. McGrorty, 2 Minn. 224 (1858); City of St. Paul v. Stamm,
106 Minn. 81, 118 N. W. 154 (1908); State v. Johnson, 139 Minn. 500, 166
N. W. 123 (1918).; State v. Wellman, 143 Minn. 488, 173 N. W. 574 (1919);
State v. Johnson, 146 Minn. 468, 177 N. W. 657 (1920).
3 Minn. Gen. Stat. (1923) c. 104, § 10747 et seq.
4 Minn. Gen. Stat. (1923) c. 104, § 10756.
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uncertain, suggesting that the idea of an appeal by the state was
probably never called to the attention of the legislature. In the
first Minnesota case in which the question was presented, the
court held that the state was not entitled to be heard in the
supreme court, reasoning as follows: first, it is very doubtful
whether at common law the state was entitled to appeal; second,
the earlier New York cases interpreting statutes similar to those
in Minnesota denied appeals to the state; third, though New York
later changed its laws to permit writs of error to be brought by
the state, linnesota had not done so; and fourth, as the statute
provided for the discharge of the prisoner following an order
sustaining a demurrer to the indictment and made no provision
for rearrest, no appeal or review was contemplated by the legis-
lature.5 The later cases concede that the legislature might
properly provide for state appeals, but hold that in the absence
of such legislation the question is concluded by the earlier deci-
sions.
In jurisdictions other than Connecticut and Minnesota, the
question has been answered in a variety of ways, covering prac-
tically every possibility between the two etremes. A few join
with Minnesota in forbidding appeals or reviews on behalf of
the state in all cases; r in some instances the courts go so far as
to decline to consider points raised by the state on appeals taken
by defendants.7 In some states, appeals are permitted only in
the case of major offenses, 8 in others, only in the case of minor
offenses9 In a few jurisdictions, even in the absence of statute,
it has been held that the state is entitled to a review of a judg-
5 State v. McGrorty, supa note 2.
6 Commonwealth v. Cummings, 3 Cush. 212 (Mass. 1S49); Tc-.. Const.
art. 5, § 26; Code Cr. Proc. (1925) art. 812; Prescott v. State, 52 Tex.
Cr. App. 35, 105 S. W. 192 (1907); State v. Morgan, 4 Tex. App. W3 (1S73);
City of Valdosta v. Goodwin, 21 Ga. App. 664, 94 S. E. 812 (1918). And
see note to Kepner v. United States, 1 Ann. Caz. 664 (1906).
7 Prescott v. State, supra note 6; Parks v. State, 21 Ga. App. 506, 94
S. E. 628 (1917); Bryan v. State, 3 Ga. App. 26, 59 S. E. 185 (1907).
8 State v. Harrison, 154 La. 1011, 98 So. 022 (1923); City of Sheridan
v. Cadle, 24 Wyo. 293, 157 Pac. 392 (1916) (no appeal in a prosecution
for the violation of a city ordinance, appeals by the state being limited
to offenses against state laws); State v. Adams, 142 Ark. 411, 218 S. W.
845 (1920) (appeal permitted to settle question of law, but no reversal
of judgment upon acquittal because the offense was one punishable by a
fine and imprisonment in the county jail).
9 Baldwin v. Chicago, 68 Ill. 418 (1873); Commonwealth v. Prall, 1G
Ky. 109, 142 S. W. 202 (1912) ; Commonwealth v. Gritten, 180 Ky. 440, 202
S. W. 884 (1918). These Kentucky cases hold that the state may appeal
for the purpose of securing "correct and uniform adninistration of the
criminal law" from a judgment on a verdict of acquittal of an offense,
the punishment of which is imprisonment, but only in cases where the
punishment is a fine can it have a new trial if the previous one resulted in
a verdict of acquittal.
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ment in favor of the defendant if it is rendered prior to verdict.10
In a number of jurisdictions, statutes have been enacted which
permit the state to appeal or to have writs of review on questions
of law 11 (a) as a means of determining the constitutionality of
a statute; 12 (b) for the purpose of securing determinations of
10 State v. Buchanan, 5 Harr. & J. 317 (Md. 1821). Even though the
defendants had been discharged: People v. Swift, 59 Mich. 529, 26 N. W.
694 (1886) (mandamus); Commonwealth v. Capp, 48 Pa. St. 53 (1864)
(certiorari).
11 From an order sustaining a demurrer to an indictment or information:
State v. Hall, 27 Wyo. 224, 194 Pac. 476 (1921). (Wyo. Comp. Stat. (1910)
§§ 6242-6245); State v. Robertson, 230 Pac. 932 (0kla. 1924); State v.
Walton, 236 Pac. 629 (Okla. 1925).
From a judgment upon an order sustaining a demurrer to an indictment
or information: State v. Spencer, 37 S. D. 219, 157 N. W. 662 (1916)
(regardless of whether the state had a right to present a new information);
People v. Apple, 57 Calif. App. 110, 206 Pac. 487 (1922) (Calif. Penal
Code (Deering, 1923) §§ 1238, 1240); State v. Anderson, 119 Wash. 280,
205 Pac. 378 (1922) (Wash. Comp. Stat. (Remington, 1922) § 1716); State
v. Rickenberg, 58 Utah, 270, 198 Pac. 767 (1921) (2 Utah Comp. Laws
(1917) § 9208, subd. 1).
From a judgment quashing or setting aside an information or indictment:
Calif. Penal Code (Deering, 1923) § 1238; District of Columbia v. Horning,
47 D. C. App. 413 (1918) ; State v. Sherman, 144 La. 75, 80 So. 205 (1918);
State v. Dennis, 230 Pac. 935 (Okla. 1924).
From a judgment sustaining a special plea in bar: United States v.
Schreck, 6 Alaska, 412 (1921) (34 Stat. 1246, (1899) U. S. Comp. Stat.
(1916) § 1704) ; State v. B, 173 Wis. 608, 182 N. W. 474 (1921) (Wis.
Stat. (1919) § 4724a); Mich. Comp. Laws (Ann Supp. 1922) § 15842 (1) c.
From a ruling admitting evidence over the state's objection: Ex parto
Dexter, 93 Vt. 304, 107 Atl. 134 (1919).
From an order granting a writ of habeas corpus: Ala. Code (1923) §
3238.
From a judgment of an intermediate court reversing a judgment of con-
viction in the lower court: People v. Merkert, 198 App. Div. 246, 190 N. Y.
Supp. 474 (2d Dept. 1921).
From an order arresting judgment: State v. Sherman, supra; State v.
Dennis, supra; Calif. Penal Code (Deering, 1923) § 1238; State v. Hall,
183 N. C. 806, 112 S. E. 431 (1922); State v. Martin, 94 Wash. 313, 162
Pac. 356 (1917); State v. Stratiner, 119 Wash. 667, 206 Pac. 353 (1922).
Upon a question reserved by the state: State v. Dennis, supra.
From an order granting a new trial: Calif. Penal Code (Deering, 1923)
§ 1238; State v. Des Champs, 126 S. C. 416, 120 S. E. 491 (1923); Com-
monwealth v. Metcalfe, 184 Ky. 540, 212 S. W. 434 (1919).
From an order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of
the people: Calif. Penal Code (Deering, 1923) § 1238.
From a final order or judgment made or rendered before jeopardy at-
tached: State v. B, supra.
From a judgment overruling the state's demurrer to a defendant's plea
of former jeopardy: Commonwealth v. Anderson, 169 Ky. 372, 183 S. W.
898 (1916).
From an order of the court placing the defendant on probation: State
v. Municipal Court, 179 Wis. 195, 190 N. W. 121 (1922); motion for re-
hearing denied, 179 Wis. 195, 191 N. W. 565 (1923).
I2Mich. Comp. Laws (Ann. Supp. 1922) § 15842 (1); State v. Hall,
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questions of law for use as precedents; '2 or (c) to secure a better
or more uniform administration of the criminal lawy.' Gen-
erally, in such jurisdictions, the law provides that an appeal shall
not affect the judgment or bring the defendant back for a new
trial but shall be used merely for the determination of questions
of law, even though the discharge of the prisoner has followed a
determination of innocence made not by a jury but by the court,
or though the order directing a verdict of not guilty was made
by the court in excess of its power and upon a mistake of law.1 5
This limited privilege of appeal is frequently even more narrowly
restricted by interpretation. So it has been held that an appeal
is not warranted under such a law from a ruling on the sufficiency
of the evidence to sustain a conviction,", or to determine whether
the court erred in directing a verdict or compelling an election
between counts,"7 or to challenge a general finding of fact that the
defendant was not guilty, made by a court trying the case without
a jury.38
Equally interesting variations can be found in the laws govern-
ing the time when a state appeal can be taken. So, in some
jurisdictions, no appeal can be taken before final judgment; 19 in
others, no appeal can be taken after a final judgment " or after
supra note 11; Wyo. Comp. Stat. (1910) §§ 6244, 6245; Aa. Code (1923)
§ 3239; State v. Street, 117 Ala. 203, 23 So. 807 (189S); State v. Harold,
128 Ala. 39, 29 So. 592 (1901).
13 State v. Spahr, 186 Ind. 539, 117 N. E. 648 (1917).
14Ark. Dig. Stat. (Kirby, 1904) § 2603; Ark. Dig. Stat. (Crawford,
1921) §§ 3410, 3411; State v. Buchanan, sitprea note 10.
15.See authorities cited szpra note 11; 2 WILLOUGInY, CONSTITUTIO::,L
LAW (1910) 822; District of Columbia v. Burns, 32 D. C. App. 203 (190) ;
People v. Horn, 70 Calif. 17, 11 Pac. 470 (ISS6); State v. Spencer, ,pra
note 11; State v. Walton, supra note 11.
1G State v. Smith, 94 Ark. 368, 126 S. W. 1057 (1910).
17 State v. Gray, 160 Ark. 580, 255 S. W. 304 (1923).
Is State v. Mills, 160 Ark. 194, 254 S. W. 463 (1923). And see generally
as to this policy of restriction: State v. Harold, supra note 12 (appeal au-
thorized only to test constitutionality of act under which the indictment
is preferred). A judgment holding the charter of a municipal corporation
unconstitutional does not authorize an appeal; neither does a judgment
which holds the act creating the court in which the prosecution is instituted
to be unconstitutional. State v. Morris, 39 So. 539 (Ala. 1905); 2 BisnoP,
Nrw CnrimNAL PnocnDuPm (2d ed. 1913) § 1272.
Under a statute (N. Y. Laws 1880, c. 533) permitting appeal by the
people upon a judgment for the defendant, on a demurrer to the indictment,
and upon an order of the court arresting judgment, it has been held that
the people cannot appeal from an order diswissing an indictment. People
v. Herbert, 152 App. Div. 579, 137 N. Y. Supp. 409 (3d Dept. 1912). Or
from an order quashing the indictment. People v. Dempsey, 31 Hun, 526
(Sup. Ct. 1884).
1.9 State v. Sherman, supra note 11; State v. Dickerson, 73 Ohio St. 193,
76 N. E. 864 (1905).
20 District of Columbia v. Homing, supr note 11; Commonwealth v.
Brown, 202 Ky. 604, 260 S. W. 374 (1924); State v. Vincent, 147 Tenn.
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the discharge of the prisoner,21 even though the order for judg-
ment be made following a directed verdict. 22
This confusion can be explained in part by the historical con-
ditions under which the law relating to criminal appeal was
developed. Prior to 1700 there was no right to an appeal or writ
of error, even upon the part of a defendant, except as a matter
of grace. In the case of Rex v. Wilkes, 3 Lord Mansfield said:
"Till the 3d of Queen Anne, a writ of error in any criminal case
was held to be merely ex gratia . .... It never was granted,
except when the King, from justice, where there really was error,
or from favour, though there was no error, was willing the out-
lawry should be reversed. After a writ of error granted, the
Attorney General never made any opposition: because, either he
had certified 'there was error,' and then he could not argue
against his own certificates; or the Crown meant to shew favour,
and then he had orders 'not to oppose.' "
Thereafter the writ of error came to be regarded not merely as
a matter of grace but of right whenever there was probably
error.2 4 But no appeal was allowed from a verdict of conviction.
In 1883, Sir James Stephen said: 25
"It is a much more important circumstance that no provision
whatever is made for questioning the decision of a jury on
matters of fact. However unsatisfactory such a verdict may be,
whatever facts may be discovered after the trial, which if known
at the trial would have altered the result, no means are at present
provided by law by which a verdict can be reversed. All that can
be done in such a case is to apply to the Queen through the Secre-
ta y of State for the Home Department for a pardon for the
person supposed to have been wrongly convicted."
The English Criminal Appeal Act of 1907 20 made possible an
appeal by a defendant from a conviction and sentence. It
abolished writs of error but extended appeals to cover questions
formerly considered in connection therewith. But it is generally
458, 249 S. W. 376 (1923); State v. Hart, 90 N. J. L. 261, 101 Atl. 278
(1917); 1 Vt. Gen. Laws (1917) § 2598; Ex parte Dexter, supra note 11
(review permitted on exceptions taken before judgment, though case taken
to Supreme Court).
21 State v. Aurell, 112 Kan. 821, 212 Pac. 899 (1923); State v. Kelsey,
49 N. D. 148, 190 N. W. 817 (1922) ; State v. Meen, 171 Wis. 36, 176 N. W.
70 (1920); State v. Adams, 123 Miss. 514, 86 So. 337 (1920).
22 See cases cited supra note 21; People v. Hastings, 214 Mich. 363, 183
N. W. 10 (1921); United States v. Weissman, 266 U. S. 377, 45 Sup. Ct.
135 (1924); Commonwealth v. Weber, 66 Pa. Super. 180 (1917); State
v. Spears, 123 Ark. 449, 185 S. W. 788 (1916).
234 Burr. 2527, 2550 (K. B. 1770).
24 Rex v. Wilkes, supra note 23; STEPHEN, GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIM-
INAL LAW (2d ed. 1890) 171; 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
(1883) 308.
25 1 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 24, at 312.
26 (1907) 7 Edw. VII, c. 23, § 3.
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agreed that the common law did not,2 7 and the law of England
does not now, provide for appeal or writs of error on the part
of the prosecution, except that appeals on points of law may be
taken in exceptional cases from decisions of the Court of Criminal
Appeal to the House of Lords.2-
This condition of the common law left the states practically
without guidance, and as a consequence there has been experi-
mentation in the field of criminal appeals, as widespread and
confusing as the imaginations of state legislatures could make it.
This period of experimentation happened to be coincident with a
period of juristic thought which emphasized the liberties or
privileges of man and subordinated the powers of government.
It followed, too, a period during which defendants were placed at
a tremendous disadvantage in criminal courts, appearing as they
did without counsel, without witnesses and without the right to
be sworn in their own behalf?3 These handicaps, suffered by de-
fendants, together with the use of torture in the preliminary
stages of prosecution, ° the very unjudicial activities of magis-
trates,32 the political interest of the government in criminal
trials -2 and the oppression of accused persons generally,3 un-
doubtedly contributed to the development of rules of procedure
designed to equalize the positions of the defendant and the state.
We would not wish to break down the present safeguards of the
accused to a point where he might again be made the victim of
persecution. The question is whether it is longer necessary or
desirable to deny the state the right to a review by an appellate
court of a case tried before a jury, on the theory that an undue
advantage would be taken of an acquitted defendant if such re-
view were permitted.
A number of reasons have been given for granting to the de-
fendant and refusing to the state the right of appeal or review.
The reason most frequently given is the constitutional guarantee
against double jeopardy. ", In its essence, the idea of double
jeopardy seems to resemble the principle of res adjudicata in
27 United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310, 12 Sup. Ct. 609 (1892) and
cases cited. Contra: State v. Buchanan, mpra note 10.
28 Criminal Appeal Act, szvpra note 26, at § 1 (6).
29 See discussion and collection of authorities on this point in 1 WG-
MORE, EvIDENcE (2d ed. 1923) 994. See also 3 CHITTY, ENGLISH STAUTEs
(6th ed. 1912) 212 n. (i); People v. Fochtman, 226 Mich. 53, 197 N. W.
166 (1924).
301 STEPHEN, op. cit. su:pra note 24, at 222, 447.
31 1 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 24, at 223, 377, 422.
321 STEPHEN, op. cit. s:pra note 24, at 418.
3 1 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 24, at 415; Sir John Wedderbourn's
Case, Fost. 22, 30 (Cr. Cas. 1746).
342 WILLOUGHBY, Op. cit. supra note 15, at 820; CLrul, Curaxnx. Pro-
cEDURE (2d ed. 1918) 453; United States v. Sanges, supra note 27; Com-
monwealth v. Perrow, 124 Va. 805, 97 S. E. 820 (1919); 17 C. J. 44.
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civil proceedings ,' and, in its earlier development at least, pro-
ceeded upon the theory that the accused having been once tried
and his case prosecuted to a final conclusion upon its merits,"
as a matter of public policy it was not desirable that he should
be again prosecuted for the same offense.
35 Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 168 (U. S. 1873): "If there is any-
thing settled in the jurisprudence of England and America, it is that no
man can be twice lawfully punished for the same offence. . . . The
principle finds expression in more than one form in the maxims of the
common law. In civil cases the doctrine is expressed by the maxim that
no man shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause. Nemo debet bis
vexari pro una et eadem causa. It is upon the foundation of this maxim
that the plea of a former judgment for the same matter, whether it be in
favor of the defendant or against him, is a good bar to an action.
"In the criminal law the same principle, more directly applicable to the
case before us, is expressed in the Latin, 'Nemo bis punitur pro eodein.
delicto,' or, as Coke has it, 'Nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto.'"
See Williams v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 93, 96 (1879); Smith v. Auld,
31 Kan. 262, 266 (1884).
3B 4 BL. COMM. *335: "First the plea of autre-fois acquit, or a former
acquittal, is grounded on this universal maxim of the common law of
England, that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than
once for the same offence. And hence it is allowed as a consequence, that
when a man is once fairly found not guilty upon any indictment, or other
prosecution, before any court having competent jurisdiction of the offense,
he may plead such acquittal in bar of any subsequent accusation for the
same crime.
"Secondly, the plea of autrefois convict, or a former conviction for the
same identical crime, though no judgment was ever given, or perhaps will
be (being suspended by the benefit of clergy or other causes), is a good
plea in bar to an indictment. And this depends upon the same principle
as the former, that no man ought to be twice brought in danger of his
life for one and the same crime."
2 RUSSELL, CRIMES (8th ed. 1923) 1818: "At common law a man who
has once been tried and acquitted for a crime may not be tried again for
the same offense if he was 'in jeopardy' on the first trial. He was so 'in
jeopardy' if (1) the Court was competent to try him for the offence; (2)
the trial was upon a good indictment, on which a valid judgment of con-
viction could be entered; and (3) the acquittal was on the merits, i. c.
by verdict on the trial, or in summary cases by dismissal on the merits
followed by a judgment or order of acquittal" [our italics].
The doctrine has been considerably extended in the United States. It
is generally stated now not in terms of prosecution to a final conclusion
upon the merits but in terms of "commencement of the trial." State v.
Keerl, 33 Mont. 501, 516, 85 Pac. 862, 864 (1906); aff'd 213 U. S. 135,
29 Sup. Ct. 469 (1909).. Or "the impaneling of the jury." Gillespie v.
State, 168 Ind. 298, 310, 317, 80 N. E. 829, 833, 836 (1907). Or "charg-
ing the jury with the deliverance of the accused," which is defined as
having occurred when the jury is impaneled and sworn to try the accused
upon a valid indictment in a competent court. Allen v. State, 52 Fla. 1,
41 So. 593 (1906) and cases cited. And in Kepner v. United States, 195
U. S. 100, 128, 24 Sup. Ct. 797, 804 (1904) it was held that "where one
has been tried before a competent tribunal having jurisdiction he has been
in jeopardy as much as he could have been in those tribunals where a
jury is alone competent to convict or acquit" [our italics].
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When we stop to consider that neither the king nor the accused
could take an appeal, we see at once the reason of the rule which
made former jeopardy turn on former conviction or former ac-
quittal. At that point the case was actually, finally determined,
presumably upon its merits, and there would have been neither
reason nor justice in a rule which would have permitted a second
trial. However, as time went on and appeals came to be allowed
upon behalf of accused persons, the situation was changed and
the determination of the case in the trial court was no longer a
final one. It became common practice, following such appeals,
to bring the accused again to trial, and to deny his plea of former
jeopardy based upon the former conviction. This is now gen-
erally recognized as an exception to the rule that a former con-
viction bars further prosecution.2T
It would seem to be a logical further step to permit appeals
by the state and again to modify the jeopardy doctrine to permit
new trials following successful state appeals from acquittals.
This is exactly what has been done and exactly the position taken
by Connecticut in the statute and cases previously referred to.
In State v. Lee,3s the decision reads as follows:
"This maxim is based upon a principle common to all systems
of jurisprudence, i.e., the finality of judicial proceedings . ..
The principle izemo bis vexare pro ca.dcm causa, gives protection
against a second judicial proceeding, and in the event of such
proceeding gives to a party the right, in criminal cases, to the
plea of autrefois acquit or autrcfois convict, and in civil cases to
the plea of res judicata; but the principle does not control the
question whether the judgment pleaded in bar is in fact a legal
and final judgment, and has no legitimate relation to the question
whether existing procedure provides for correction of errors oc-
curring in the trial. . . . And so the putting in jeopardy
means a jeopardy which is real and has continued through every
stage of one prosecution, as fixed by existing laws relating to
37 CLARK, op. cit. sutpra note 34, at 451; 1 BisHoP, CnRn.:;,%L L-w (9th
ed. 1923) 740, 741. A number of other exceptions are alzo recognized.
See, for illustrations, the following:
United States v. Riley, Fed. Cas. No. 16,164 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1864);
State v. Rook, 61 Kan. 382, 59 Pac. 653 (1900); State v. Hanford, 76
Kan. 678, 92 Pac. 551 (1907); Simmons v. United States, 142 U. S. 143,
12 Sup. Ct. 171 (1891); see State v. Nelson, 26 Ind. 366 (1366).
Or the death of a juror's mother. Stocks v. State, 91 Ga. 831, 1S S. E.
847 (1893); Caneemi v. People, 13 N. Y. 123 (1853); State v. Hudldns,
35 W. Va. 247, 13 S. E. 367 (1S91); United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat.
579 (U. S. 1824); Keerl v. State, sitpra note 36; Anderzon v. State, 8
Ald. 479, 38 Atl. 937 (1897).
See, generally, COOLEY, CONSTITuTIoNAL LInnmTAToNzS (7th cd. 1903) 463
et seq; CLARK, op. cit. supra note 34, at 442 et seq; 1 BisHoP, op. cit. cupra,
at §§ 998, 1027, 1028; People v. Fochtman, supra note 29 (trial court on
defendant's motion erroneously quashed the information after the jury had
been impaneled and sworn).
39 Supra note 1, at 271, 30 Atl. at 1110.
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procedure; while such prosecution remains undetermined the one
jeopardy has not been exhausted. . . The same underlying
principle of justice which demands a retrial because a juror is
legally disqualified, calls for a retrial when illegal evidence has
been admitted, or legal evidence excluded; in either case the trial
is tainted and should not support a valid final judgment . ..
If such further proceedings are not authorized by law, the cause
is ended, and the one jeopardy of the accused is exhausted; but
this results not from any special sanctity attributable to a verdict
tainted with illegality, but solely to the fact that the State, in-
fluenced by considerations of public policy, has decided to make
such verdict, whether just or unjust, the end of that controversy.
But when the State sees fit to provide that the cause shall not
necessarily be so ended, but that further proceedings on motion
of the accused may be had, an unjust verdict resumes its normal
position of a legal nullity; and when the State provides for like
proceedings on the motion of the prosecutor, a similar result must
follow."
The reasoning of the court in the Lee case finds support in the
dissenting opinion of Holmes, J., with whom concurred White
and McKenna, J. J., in Kepner v. United States.-" The follow-
ing excerpt will suffice:
"At the present time in this country there is more danger that
criminals will escape justice than that they will be subjected to
tyranny. But I do not stop to consider or to state the conse-
quences in detail, as such considerations are not supposed to be
enfertained by judges, except as inclining them to one of two
interpretations, or as a tacit last resort in case of doubt. It is
more pertinent to observe that it seems to me that logically and
rationally a man cannot be said to be more than once in jeopardy
in the same cause, however often he may be tried. The jeopardy
is one continuing jeopardy from its beginning to the end of the
cause. [Our italics.] Everybody agrees that the principle in its
origin was a rule forbidding a trial in a new and independent
case where a man already had been tried once. But there is no
rule that a man may not be tried tvice in the same case. It has
beendecided by this court that he may be tried a second time,
even for his life, if the jury disagree, United States v. Perez, 9
Wheat. 579; see Simmons v. United States, 142 U. S. 148; Logan
v. United States, 144 U. S. 263; Thompson v. United States, 155
U. S. 271, or notwithstanding their agreement and verdict, if the
verdict is set aside on the prisoner's exceptions for error in the
trial. Hopt v. People, 104 U. S. 631, 635; 110 U. S. 574; 114 U. S.
488, 492; 120 U. S. 430, 442; United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662,
672. He even may be tried on a new indictment if the judgment
on the first is arrested upon motion. Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall.
163, 174; 1 Bish. Crim. Law (5th ed.), § 998. I may refer fur-
ther to the opinions of Kent and Curtis in People v. Olcott, 2
Johns. Cas. 301; S. C., 2 Day, 507, n.; United States v. Morris, 1
Curtis, 23, and to the well-reasoned decision in State V. Lee, 65
Connecticut, 265.
"If a statute should give the right to take exceptions to the
39 Supra note 36, at 134, 24 Sup. Ct. at 807.
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Government, I believe it would be impossible to maintain that the
prisoner would be protected by the Constitution from being tried
again. He no mnore would be put in jeopar'dy a second tize when
retried because of a mistake of law in his favor, than he would
be when retried for am istake that did him harm. [Our italics.]
It cannot matter that the prisoner procures the second trial. In
a capital case, like Hopt v. People, a man cannot waive, and cer-
tainly will not be taken to waive without meaning it, fundamental
constitutional rights. Thompson ?v. Utah, l70 U. S. 343, 353, 354.
Usually no such waiver is expressed or thought of. Moreover, it
cannot be imagined that the law would deny to a prisoner the
correction of a fatal error, unless he should waive other rights
so important as to be saved by an express clause in the Constitu-
tion of the United States.
"It might be said that when the prisoner takes exceptions he
only is trying to get rid of a jeopardy that already exists-that
so far as the verdict is in his favor, as when he is found guilty
of manslaughter upon an indictment for murder, according to
some decisions he will keep it and can be retried only for the less
offense, so that the jeopardy only is continued to the extent that
it already has been determined against him, and is continued
with a chance of escape. I believe the decisions referred to to
be wrong, but, assuming them to be right, we must consider his
position at the moment when his exceptions are sustained. The
first verdict has been set aside. The jeopardy created by that
is at an end, and the question is what shall be done with the
prisoner. Since at that moment he no longer is in jeopardy from
the first verdict, if a second trial in the same case is a secondjeopardy even as to the less offense, he has a right to go free.
In view of these difficulties it has been argued that on principle
he has that right if a mistake of law is committed at the first trial.
1 Dish. Crim. Law (5th ed.), §§ 999, 1047. But even Mr. Bishop
admits that the decisions are otherwise, and the point is settled
in this court by the cases cited above. That fetish happily being
destroyed, the necessary alternative is that the Constitution per-
mits a second trial in the same case. The reason, however, is
not the fiction that a man is 'not h jcopardy in case of a misdiec-
tion, for it must be admitted that he is i, jeopardy, ceven whca
the error is patent on the face of the record, as whcn he is tricd
on a defective indictment, [our italics] if judgment is not ar-
rested. United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662. Moreover, if the
fiction were true, it would be equally true when the misdirection
was in favor of the prisoner. The reason, I subnit, is that there
can be but one jeopardy i one case. I have seCn n9o other, except
the suggestion of vaiver, and that I think cannot stand." [our
italics].
The desirability of the Connecticut rule and the unfortunate
effect of the majority rule are forcibly pointed out in the Penn-
sylvania case of Commonwealth v. Fitzpatric6,4 where the court,
in applying the majority rule under protest, said:
"It [the plea of once in jeopardy] alleges only that there might
have been a conviction or an acquittal, if the judge trying the
40 121 Pa. St. 109, 117, 15 AtI. 466, 463 (1383).
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cause had not made a mistake in law which prevented a verdict.
It is of no consequence how many mistakes he makes, if the trial
results in a conviction. The mistakes can be corrected on a writ
of error and the defendant tried over again. But if the mistake
results in closing the trial without a verdict, this is remediless.
The court that made it cannot correct it. The proper court of
review cannot correct it. The consequence is that a defendant
charged with taking the life of his fellow man goes out of the
court and out of the reach of justice because of a mistake in law
made after an honest and painstaking effort to be right. Such
was the case of Hilands v. Commonwealth. Such is this case.
But the constitutional provision is plain and its enforcement by
the courts has been uniform."
Reduced to its lowest terms, the use of the jeopardy doctrine
in any degree to prevent appeal by the state results in an ab-
surdity. What it amounts to is this: When the verdict of the
jury favors the defendant, then the determination is and should
be conclusive; when it favors the state, it is not and should not
be conclusive. Stated thus baldly, the proposition is an amazing
one. Calling it an application of the rule of former jeopardy is
merely hiding behind convenient terminology. This fact has
apparently been recognized in some jurisdictions, where it is ex-
pressly provided "that no person shall, after an acquittal, be tried
for the same offence." [our italics] .4 Here we have a frank rec-
ognition of the proposition that the defendant is entitled to sub-
stantial advantages over the state in criminal prosecutions, which
are not given to litigants in any other class of cases. This is
an outgrowth of the same philosophy as that which permits the
defendant to refuse to testify; which gives him the presumption
of innocence; which gives the state the burden of proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt; which permits the defendant to use
the depositions of absent witnesses while denying that privilege
to the state; which requires the state to set out a list of its wit-
nesses in the indictment, but permits the defendant to conceal
the names of his witnesses; which requires the state to set out
its contentions in minute detail, but permits the defendant to
raise such issues as insanity without notice during the trial; and
which, in general, insists that it is better for nine guilty men
to escape than that one innocent man should be punished. That
philosophy applied to conditions of life and methods of crime
as they exist in the United States seems to have produced a
rather unhappy result. Our inquiry must be whether it is a
philosophy which is still usable and workable to the same extent
as in the days of its development; and particularly is it our duty
to determine whether the methods of procedure originally devised
for its application are still appropriate.
4i State v. Hart, supra note 20, at 269, 101 Atl. at 281; State v. Leo,
10 R. I. 494 (1873); State v. Wyse, 33 S. C. 582, 12 S. E. 556 (1890);
State v. Kennedy, 96 Miss. 624, 50 So. 978 (1910) (acquittal ,or conviction).
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Considered as an original proposition in the light of present
day conditions, it is hard to make out a case to support the con-
tention that a man accused of crime would suffer any hardship
as a result of an appeal, either in the appellate court or in a trial
court to which his case would be returned for a new trial, which
would be in any way disproportionate to the disadvantage which
society now suffers from permitting an appeal by the accused.
Let us consider, in order, further reasons which have been as-
signed for preserving in most jurisdictions this unequal condi-
tion.
First in importance, no doubt, is the idea that there is an
almost sacred significance in the verdict of a "jury of his peers."
Blackstone expresses the idea in terms which have been echoed
and restated many times during the last one hundred and fifty
years: 42
"Upon these accounts the trial by jury ever has been, and I
trust ever will be, looked upon as the glory of the English law.
And if it has so great an advantage over others in regulating civil
property, how much must that advantage be heightened when
it is applied to criminal cases! . . . it is the most transcend-
ent privilege which any subject can enjoy, or wish for, that he
cannot be affected either in his property, his liberty, or his person,
but by the unanimous consent of twelve of his neighbors and
equals. A constitution that I may venture to affirm has, under
Providence, secured the just liberties of this nation for a long
succession of ages. And therefore a celebrated French w.riter,
who concludes that because Rome, Sparta, and Carthage have
lost their liberties, therefore those of England in time must
perish, should have recollected that Rome, Sparta, and Carthage,
at the time when their liberties were lost, were strangers to the
trial by jury. . . . Here therefore a competent number of
sensible and upright jurymen, chosen by lot from among those
of the middle rank, will be found the best investigators of truth,
and the surest guardians of public justice."
The argument continues that after a group of twelve men, repre-
sentative of "this admirable constitution," have once declared an
accused person to be innocent, no biased court should be per-
mitted to declare otherwise "either by boldly asserting that to be
proved which is not so, or by more artfully suppressing some cir-
cumstances, stretching and warping others, and distinguishing
away the remainder." -3
As has been previously pointed out, Blackstone's eulogy was
spoken with reference to a time when the defendant in a criminal
case was by no means so well protected as he is today, and at a
time when the members of trial juries must needs be possessed
of considerable courage themselves to withstand the coercion of
42 3 BL. C Dm. *379.
43 Ibid.
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judges.44 The changes which have taken place in criminal pro-
cedure since then have been described as "so great that a trial
on a charge of crime now bears as little resemblance to one in the
time of the Stuarts, as the service in a Christian church does to
the heathen sacrifice to idols." 45 In the light of these changed
conditions we are coming to regard the jury as a somewhat less
hallowed institution. Roscoe Pound makes this temperate state-
ment regarding its adoption in the United States: 40
"The colonists had had experience of the close connection of
criminal law with politics. The pioneers who had preserved the
memory of this experience were not concerned solely to do away
with the brutality of the old law as to felonies. Even more
their constant fear of political oppression through the criminal
law led them and the generation following, which had imbibed
their ideas, to exaggerate the complicated, expensive and dilatory
machinery of a common law prosecution, lest some safeguard of
individual liberty be overlooked, to give excessive power to juries
and to limit or even cut off the power of the trial judge to control
the trial and hold the jury to its province . . . the community
did not require the swift moving punitive justice, adjusted to
the task of enforcing a voluminous criminal code against a multi-
tude of offenders, which we demand today" [our italics].
On the other hand, much present day comment concerning the
jury is by no means so temperate, and reputable legal periodicals
are today giving space to articles carrying such titles as Abolish
The Jury 47 and Trial By Jury: An Ineffective Survival.4" There
are few well-informed people today, who are sufficiently im-
pressed with the caliber of trial juries or the quality of their
verdicts, to suggest that a defendant should be concluded by an
adverse verdict on all questions of law and fact. But when we
concede so much in justifying the defendant's right of appeal,
can we well avoid the conclusion that the state and the individual
members of society which it represents are equally entitled to a
further hearing?
There are some perhaps who would go even further in insisting
that the jury's verdict of not guilty should be final, on the theory
that, through the medium of such verdicts, jurys can and do
exercise a necessary extra-legal control and restraint upon the
enforcement of unwise or unpopular laws. That such control is
now exercised, informed persons will not deny. Prosecuting at-
torneys do undoubtedly shape their policies upon the attitude of
communities as expressed by juries. If juries consistently re-
fuse to convict in particular types of cases, prosecutions of such
44 9 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw (1926) 225.
45 1 BL. COi. (Cooley's 2d ed. 1872) xxv.
46 THE SPIRIT OF THE COMTION LAw (1921) 122.
47 McWhorter, 57 Am. L. REv. 42 (1923).
48 Sebille, 10 AM. B. A. J. 53 (1924).
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cases cease. Whether this is a desirable situation may not be
so freely granted. The idea is clearly contrary to the legalistic
conteption that general laws should not be varied in their ad-
ministration according to local customs or prejudices. Conced-
ing that the situation does exist and that some persons would
defend it as proper, let us inquire what the effect of state appeals
would be. A successful state appeal could be based only upon
errors appearing in the record on appeal. If the record showed
an errorless proceeding followed by a verdict of not guilty the ap-
pellate court could not reverse the judgment. It could not even
reverse upon the ground that the evidence failed to sustain the
verdict, as in civil cases; for the prosecution carries the burden
of convincing the jury beyonzd a resonwble doubt, and if, in the
particular case, the jury said that it was not convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt, it would be indeed an omniscient court which
could say that the jury was so convinced.
Assuming that error did appear and the case went back for a
new trial another jury could if it wished again acquit in accord-
ance with the will of the community. It may be contended that
a reversal would have the effect of coercing the second jury into
finding a verdict of guilty. It is doubtful if such a contention
could be supported with any substantial evidence, but"conceding
its truth for the purpose of argument, then in a case so flagrant
that an appellate court spoke so strongly as in fact to coerce a
second jury and the jury was actually coerced; it is submitted
that it were better for a community to be deprived of its pre-
rogative of setting aside the law and compelled either to abide
by the will of the majority as expressed in the law or to secure
legislation changing it.
Let us consider next the argument that appeals by the state
should not be permitted because we have already too many ap-
-peals. This contention, logically carried out, brings us to the
conclusion that we should return to the old idea and permit no
appeals at all in criminal cases. If there be any merit in the
contention that a verdict of not guilty should be final and conclu-
sive, there is no sound reason, under present day conditions, why
a verdict of guilty should not be equally conclusive. We can
safely assume, no doubt, that appeals by defendants will not be
abolished, though there has been some tendency to limit them
by prohibiting reversals upon technical errors which do not affect
the substantial rights of accused persons.O Conceding that ap-
peals may have been too frequent or too freely allowed in the
past, it must be remembered that those have been appeals by
defendants and certainly the fact that appeals have been too
49 Calif. Const. art. VI, § 4M ; Calif. Penal Code (Deering, 1923) §§ OGO,
1258, 1404; see (1925) 35 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 105; State v. Anderzon,
165 Minn. 150, 206 N. W. 51 (1925).
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freely allowed to defendants is no argument against allowing ap-
peals to the state. It could equally well be said that there are
too many appeals in civil cases, but surely no one would urge as
a remedy for that situation that all appeals by plaintiffs should
be prohibited.
If it be urged in this connection that over-zealous prosecutors
would be apt to make many unwarranted appeals it can be safely
answered that there is no danger of such a contingency. Prob-
ably the best demonstration of this point is to be found by an
examination of the record of appealed cases in Connecticut since
appeals by the state have been permitted. An examination of
the appealed criminal cases which are reported in the Connecti-
cut Relorts, Volumes 82 to 98, gives the following results:
Appealed by the state, 7: affirmed, 5; reversed, 2.
Appealed by defendants, 82: affirmed, 56; reversed, 24; judg-
ment for the defendant, 1; appeal dismissed, 1.
Reserved by the court, 2: judgment for the state, 1; judgment
for the defendant, 1.
Both the cases appealed by the state and those reserved by the
court involved questions of constitutionality of laws, of public
policy or of the extent of jurisdiction of trial courts.
The experience of attorneys general, in states in which they
are charged with representing the state on appeals taken by de-
fendants, is that it is surprisingly difficult in most cases to main-
tain any interest in the case or to get substantial assistance from
the attorney who prosecuted the case. The conventional picture
of the blood-thirsty prosecutor is a far cry from that individual
as he usually exists in real life. A moment's consideration of the
tremendous "leakage" of cases in the course of prosecution, from
arrest to verdict,50 will demonstrate clearly enough a fact well
known to those about the criminal courts, that since the abandon-
ment of the fee system, under which the prosecutor was paid
according to the number of convictions which he obtained, the
main object of that officer is to get rid of his cases as quickly,
albeit as gracefully as possible.
The next argument advanced against state appeals is based
upon the hardship which is involved for the defendant. It is
urged that it would be eminently unfair to the individual defend-
ant if the state, after dragging him through the weary procedure
of the trial court, could keep its indictment hanging over him
for an indefinite period, could require his appearance in the
appellate court and then perhaps return him again to the trial
court for a new trial. Considered in terms of an innocent, har-
xassed and indigent defendant, the argument is very persuasive.
Considered in terms of a tricky crook or a depraved murderer
5o POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND (Chemical Foundation, 1922)
236-237.
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who has cheated justice by fraud and intimidation, it is not
persuasive at all. As the issue to be determined in each case is
guilt or innocence, we cannot assume innocence, but must con-
sider the character of our procedure to determine whether it is
adequate to protect both the individual defendant and society in
emergencies. The defendant in a civil action may be equally
unwilling and equally blameless, but we have no compunctions
against permitting his adversary to exhaust him mentally and
financially by resort to any court in which he can make a prima
facie showing. There seems to be no clear reason why we should
be so soft-hearted about permitting the state to take an appeal
where the case is one of so much greater magnitude in its effect
on society as to have been included within the scope of criminal
law.
This argument is usually given point in terms of the hardships
which would result from the gTeat delay to which the accused
would be subjected by being forced to await the result of an ap-
peal and perhaps a new trial. As a matter of fact, society has
already much to apologize for on that score, and if the argument
is conclusive, then we should abandon criminal prosecutions al-
together. Mlany a poor man has been financially ruined by long
incarceration, awaiting the determination of the officers, whether
prosecution should be commenced or not, awaiting the convening
of a grand july, or awaiting his turn on a crowded trial calendar.
This objection presents no insurmountable obstacle so far as
appeals are concerned. Criminal appeals could be given a pre-
ferred position on the calendar as is already done in some juris-
dictions; 5" special criminal divisions could be created as has been
done in others; the time for perfecting appeals could be materi-
ally shortened; and, for that matter, the defendant could even be
released on his own recognizance pending appeal. He would not
be any freer then than he is now following absolute discharge.
If the judgment were reversed he could be rearrested.
Some have suggested that the most important reason for pre-
venting state appeals is that the defendant should not be required
to stand the expense of an appeal. If this be regarded as a really
great obstacle it can easily be taken care of by letting the state
pay the costs, as is frequently done in the trial court, and as
may be done in some jurisdictions when the defendant appeals c2
This would place the defendant in a criminal case in an even
51 Morse v. United States, 168 Fed. 49 (1909); People v. Durrant, 119
Calif. 201, 51 Pac. 185 (1897) ; cf. State v. Peter, 13 La. Ann. 232 (1353);
United States v. Norton, 91 U. S. 55S (1875); Stone v. State, 20 N. J. L.
404 (1845).
52 State v. Harris, 151 Iowa, 234, 130 N. W. 10S2 (1911); People v.
Willett, 1 How. Pr. (N. S.) 196 (N. Y. Sup. CL 1835); Burden v. State,
70 Tex. Cr. App. 349, 156 S. W. 1196 (1913); State v. Fennimore, 2 Wasb.
370, 26 Pac. 807 (1891).
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better position than a litigant in a civil case. It would perhaps
also have a tendency to check unwarranted appeals. There would
probably be little danger of that, however, for as has been pre-
viously pointed out, in most cases the prosecutor would be well
content to abide by the verdict. The ultimate saving which
would result from improved administration would far more than
offset the cost which such a method would entail to the state.
This will be spoken of at greater length.
The argument has been further supported on the theory that
the reputation of the acquitted defendant would be materially
injured by subjecting him to an appeal. If he be actually guilty,
then the loss of reputation is a cost which society has adjudged
to be a proper one. An appeal would do no more than has already
been done in the trial court. If he be innocent, then his reputa-
tion would be in much better condition following a favorable
decision by the appellate court than it was following a verdict
in the trial court accompanied by whispers of jury bribery, in-
timidation of witnesses and corruptioA of judges. If the question
involved be a vital one concerning matters of public policy, con-
stitutional law or jurisdiction of courts, then, in the absence of
a system which permits of declaratory judgments, the very con-
tinuance of the growth of the law requires that the individual
litigant suffer the hardships incident to a proper final determina-
tion of the question by a competent court.
The foregoing are the arguments and reasons usually relied
upon to support the rule prohibiting state appeals. Probably the
real reason which has permitted a continuation of the discrimi-
nation is society's lack of interest in securing a better adjustment,
coupled with a very active interest on the part of defense at-
torneys in preserving the advantages now enjoyed by them. A
large percentage of our state legislators are lawyers. Generally
these are men whose experience with criminal cases has been
limited to the side of the defense. As a consequence they are
alert to protect their own interests and the fate of any measure
designed to put more teeth into criminal procedure is in their
hands.5 3 The other members of the legislature are usually will-
ing to take the word of the lawyer members as to the desirability
or undesirability of any proposed change in legal procedure, and
there it ends. The experience of England in securing changes
in her procedural law through the agency of a commission made
up in large part of lay members is peculiarly suggestive. 4
As has been already pointed out, the present-day prosecutor
53 Pound, Dedicatory Address (1925) 24 GEORGE WASHINGTON U. BULL.
15, at 19-21; Wigmore, Technicality in Indictments (1925) 16 Joun. OF
CRimi. LAW AND CRIM. 166.
" SUNDERLAND, HANDBOOK OF ASSOCIATION or AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS
(1925) 74.
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is not usually inclined to urge any measure which means an in-
crease in his labors. He has been made a victim of such a
tremendous increase of duties resulting from the mass production
of new legislation that he is rather inclined to become vocal in
terms of protest. The courts are not anxious to increase their
burdens and this may explain in part their opinions in the cases
which have built up the present common law and Iinnesota
doctrine. The whole administration of criminal justice laclm
motive power.5 The prosecuting witness has none of the per-
sonal interest of the litigant in a civil action. He soon wearies
of the case, and is induced to quit, either by persuasion or intimi-
dation. The average prosecutor will not even commence prosecu-
tion unless some person or agency is active in urging it. The
result is that the business of defending criminals thrives and the
survival of rules of procedure such as that prohibiting appeals
by the state is made easy.
Now let us look at the other side of the question and examine
some of the considerations favoring state appeals. While we
cannot ruthlessly wipe out the advantages in procedure which
have been built up for the accused over a long period of years we
should honestly examine the matter from time to time to see
whether the balance is relatively even. From the point of view
of all the people who collectively make up the state, there can be
no doubt that the success of the administration of criminal law
as a protective agency is measured largely in terms of the appre-
hension and conviction of guilty persons. It is well kmown that
many guilty persons are never apprehended, that many who are
apprehended are never prosecuted and that many who are prose-
cuted are never convicted." The farther the process goes in
each particular case, the greater the probability of guilt and the
greater the capital outlay of investment which the state puts into
making the process effective. Every conviction of a guilty man
goes to make up the total of effective administration. Every
guilty man who escapes conviction helps to break down effective
administration and wastes the capital outlay which society has
made for its protection. This may seem to be a cold-blooded
method of appraisal, but the business of collecting taxes, building
court houses, selecting officers, arresting and prosecuting crimi-
nals is itself a cold-blooded process. If the loss in successful
prosecutions becomes proportionately great, the morale of the
55 See Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 53; articles by the present writer
in (1923) 46 ANNUAL REPORT Ai. BAn AsS'N 608, and Information or In-
dictments in Felony Cases (1924) 8 MINN. L. RBv. 379, 384. A Kansas
court held that the action of a Ku Klux Klan in sponsoring and aiding
prosecution was laudable, apparently assuming that some such asistance
was necessary. State v. Stockton, 119 Kan. 868, 241 Pac. 683 (1925).
r6 CRIINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND, s-upra note 50, at 236, 237 et seq.;
8 MINN. L. REv. 379, 387, 403.
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whole administrative organization becomes low; criminals be-
come bold, and the people, first scornful of the agencies which
they have set up, are then in desperation apt to adopt extreme
measures.
Does the fact that the state is not permitted to appeal con-
tribute in any measure to the unfortunate situation suggested?
Suppose that a prosecuting attorney deliberately misconducts
himself in the prosecution of a case in order to induce an ac-
quittal; 57 suppose that a defense attorney so misconducts himself
as to secure an acquittal and contemptuously disregards the rights
of the state in presenting his client's case; s suppose that a trial
judge, through ignorance, so incorrectly charges a jury that it
acquits, or so deliberately evades the meaning and purpose of
the law that he directs a dismissal or an acquittal.9 Can there
be any question that the effect of a final conclusion of such a case
by a jury's verdict must necessarily be an unfortunate one? Can
there be any serious question that some way of avoiding such
miscarriages of justice should be provided? Even permitting an
appeal on questions of law, with the proviso that the acquitted
defendant shall not be further concerned, as is done in some juris-
5 Shideler v. State, 129 Ind. 523, 28 N. E. 537 (1891); petition for re-
hearing overruled, 129 Ind. 523, 29 N. E. 36 (1891) ; State v. Reed, 26 Conn.
201 (1857); State v. Moon, 41 Wis. 684 (1877); Attorney General v. Pel-
letier, 240 Mass. 264, 134 N. E. 407 (1922); Attorney General v. Tufts,
239 Mass. 458, 132 N. E. 322 (1921).
58 Luttrell v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 651, 51 S. W. 930 (1899); see
infra note 75.
so 1 BisHop, op. cit. supra note 37, at § 1026 (2) ; 2 WILLOUGHBY, op. cit.
supra note 15, at 820; State v. Wong Hip Chung, 74 Mont. 523, 241 Pac.
620 (1925).
Brown, J., dissenting in Kepner v. United States, supra note 36, at 137,
24 Sup. Ct. at 808:- "It seems to me impossible to suppose that Congress
intended to place in the hands of a single judge the great and dangerous
power of finally acquitting the most notorious criminals." But the majority
of the court, stating the general rule prevailing in the United States held,
at 133, 24 Sup. Ct. at 806: "The court of first instance, having jurisdiction
to try the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused, found Kepner
not guilty; to try him again upon the merits, even in an appellate court,
is to put him a second time in jeopardy for the sime offense, .
United States v. Weissman, supra note 22, at 379, 45 Sup. Ct. at 136:
"It is suggested that the course adopted in this case offers to the lower
court a means of escaping the review allowed by the act; and there is an
innuendo that there was a desire of that sort below. But such consider-
ations do not affect the construction of the act, and it is fair to say that
while the judge should not have directed a verdict when he did so, and
if he thought the indictment bad should have quashed it before tthe jury
came in, and left the question in form to be taken up, [our italics] still
we see no sufficient reason for supposing that the direction was given with
any notion of escaping the jurisdiction of this Court.
"Writ dismissed for want of jurisdiction."
State v. Gooch, 60 Ark. 218, 29 S. W. 640 (1895); Commonwealth v.
Goulet, 140 Ky. 843, 132 S. W. 151 (1910).
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dictions, does not completely solve the problem; for if the pris-
oner be discharged following the verdict in the trial court and
thereafter the appellate court determines that the verdict was
reached as a result of error, the state finds itself in this anom-
alous position: that, on the one hand, it has consented to a dis-
charge of the accused, free and clear of all punishment or blame;
while, at the same time, its highest court has pronounced solemn
judgment that he is or may be guilty of the crime charged against
him.
In addition to our interest in securing a proper trial upon the
merits in each case in order to prevent individual miscarriages
of justice, there is further need of state appeals in order to secure
a proper development of criminal law, both substantive and pro-
cedural. The unfortunate situation which now exists, in this re-
spect, where the state is not permitted to appeal is illustrated
by the following example: In a case prosecuted under a new
statute, the defendant demurs to the indictment on the ground
that it fails to state a public offense because the statute is uncon-
stitutional. The court sustains the demurrer. In Minnesota
that decision is final, at least for the county in which the prosecu-
tion takes place. 0  An incidental result may be that in one county
the law is operating one way and in another in an opposite way
with no uniformity possible until a defendant chooses to raise
the question on appeal. It seems rather remarkable, in a country
which debates so violently, from time to time, the propriety of
permitting the Supreme Court of the United States to pass on
the constitutionality of legislative acts, that at the same time we
tolerate a method which makes possible a final adjudication of
unconstitutionality by a trial court. ,6 This defect has been recog-
nized even in some states which have persisted in prohibiting
state appeals.6 2  In others, as has been previously noted,ci re-
60 State v. Johnson, 139 Blinn. 500, 166 N. W. 123 (1918); see other
Minnesota cases supra note 2.
61 See infra note 715; cf. Mlilton Dairy Co. v. G. N. Ry., 124 Blinn. 29,
144 N. W. 764 (1914).
62 State v. Lee, supra note 41, at 495: "The counsel contends that the
jurisdiction is necessary to secure uniformity of decision. The want of
such uniformity is doubtless an evil, but it is an evil which the people
have chosen to run the hazard of, rather than e.xpose a citizen who has
once been fairly acquitted to the more perilous evil of repeated prosecution"
Commonwealth v. Cummings, spra note 6, at 213: "A worse uncertainty
of the law can hardly be conceived, than that where the legislative acts
of a government, by which all persons within its limits ought to be equally
bound and protected, should receive a different final construction, in dif-
ferent judicial tribunals, and thus have a different operation upon those who
are alike subject to then."
63 See supra. note 12. State v. Dickerson, stpra note 19, at 193, 76 N. E.
at 864: "The right of appeal or to a review by proceedings in error is
statutory (Wagner v. The State, 42 Ohio St., 537) and, when the right is
given, it is a rule of interpretation that the right is given only to the
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views upon questions of law have been provided for the express
purpose of settling questions of this character.
Another example is to be found in erroneous rulings of trial
courts, adverse to the state, on points of law during the trial.
The fact that such errors are committed is well known to practi-
tioners and it is clearly revealed on appeal in jurisdictions which
permit state appeals . 4 Where no such appeals are allowed, of
course in most cases no record is ever made in the appellate court
upon such errors. Occasionally they appear in the defendant's
record and the casual way in which the state's side of the case is
then disposed of is well illustrated in a recent Missouri case:
"The last point to be noticed is in reference to alleged improper
conduct of counsel for the state in propounding certain questions
and in argument of the case.
"In so far as the propounding of questions is concerned, the
court sustained objections made to all of them to which counsel
has called our attention, except one. No rebuke of counsel was
asked. The propriety of sustaining all of such objections is not
readily apparent to us. But, as the objections were sustained,
they are out of the case" [our italics].
The same situation exists in connection with instructions given
to the jury in the trial court. Here again the situation is occa-
sionally revealed by comments of the appellate court. The fol-
lowing is a typical example from a recent federal case: 00
"The charge of the court certainly gave to the defendants and
all of them all, if not more, than the law permitted, because the
court apparently assumed that this was a borderline case and left
the matter to the jury."
It is equally true that procedural law and the law of criminal
evidence have suffered from a one-sided development, and it is
probably true that the percentage of acquittals has been largely
increased by the attitude of trial judges on these points. Cases
proving this contention could be cited without number. An
defendant and not to the state, (State v. Simmons, 49 Ohio St., 305), con-
sequently, if a trial court misconceived or misapplied the law, it might be
impossible in that court to secure a conviction of a similar offense, [our
italics] wherefore it is provided by section 7305, Revised Statutes, and
the several sections following, that the prosecuting attorney may except
to any decision of the court and apply to the supreme court for permission
to file his bill of exceptions, for the decision of that court upon the points
presented therein."
02 See cases cited supra notes 8-14.
65 State v. Sloan, 309 Mo. 498, 517, 274 S. W. 734, 739 (1925).
66 Sabbatino v. United States, 298 Fed. 409, 411 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924).
Another example can be found in the case of Ford v. United States, 10
Fed. (2d) 339, 349 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926) where the court said: "We think
the charge was more favorable to these plaintiffs in error than they were
entitled to, . ...
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example which came within the writer's own experience and
which will serve to illustrate it, is the case of People v. Ah Leo
decided by the District Court of Appeals of California,,7 where
the court in discussing the rulings of the trial court in the recep-
tion of evidence said:
"It is proper to add that the trial judge in this case went even
further than the law required him to go in restricting the pur-
pose for which he allowed the evidence as to the acts committed
by appellant on previous occasions with the complainant. Upon
the objection being made to this testimony, the judge said: 'Well,
I will state to the jury that this evidence is not admitted for the
purpose of the jury using any of the testimony to show that the
defendant had committed those acts other than the one charged;
it isn't admitted for the purpose of the jury using that testimony
to establish the guilt of the defendant, but it is admitted for thejury to determine whether or not the defendant kmew tls boy
at or prior to the time of the act charged; the jury will consider
it only for that purpose; . . .' The purpose for which such
testimony in cases of this class is allowed is of a broader nature.
The testimony is admitted as corroborative of the main charge
and as tending to show the disposition of the accused and his
proneness to commit the crime of the particular nature involved.
In this case the court considered the testimony only admissible
for the purpose of strengthening the proof given by the com-
plainant which went to the identity of the person who had in-
dulged in the vicious relation with him."
It should be noted that in this case the evidence referred to by
the appellate court was first offered by the prosecutor as corrobo-
rative of the main charge (a proper purpose) but was ex:cluded
by the trial judge. It was later offered again to rebut the ap-
pellant's testimony that he had never lmown the complainant
and was received with the limitation stated. Had the appellant
been acquitted the matter could never have been presented on
appeal and a valuable decision on an important point would
have been lost.
From the standpoint of the appellate court, too, it is desirable
that the state should be permitted to raise points on appeal and
that points so presented should not be mere moot questions. In
some jurisdictions, as has been noted, appeals are permitted to
review points of law. If the major purpose of such a review is
to establish the law for the guidance of trial courts, then every
facility should be provided to secure as full and adequate a pres-
entation as possible. However, if the defendant be discharged
upon a verdict of not guilty, or orders of the court, he steps out
of the case and his side of it is not presented in the appellate
court. Even when the case is contested, only too frequently the
6 28 Calif. App. 164, 166, 151 Pac. 748, 749 (1915). See alzo State v.
Wakefield, 111 Or. 615, 228 Pac. 115 (1924); Alt v. State, 83 Neb. 259,
129 N. W. 432 (1911); State v. La Due, 164 Blinn. 499, 203 N. W. 450
(1925); United States v. Weissman, supra note 22.
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court is not adequately assisted by counsel.,8 If the case were
not contested, no matter how well presented it might be by the
state, the court would have but one side of it. It was on exactly
this ground that the United States Supreme Court held uncon-
stitutional a provision in the statutes of the District of Co-
lumbia 19 which attempted to give this limited right of appeal to
the government in criminal cases. In the case of United States
v. Evans,70 Fuller, C. J., speaking for the court, said:
"The appellee in such a case, having been freed from further
prosecution by the verdict in his favor, has no interest in the ques-
tion that may be determined in the proceedings on appeal, and
may not even appear. Nor can his appearance be enforced.
Without opposing argument, which is so important to the attain-
ment of a correct conclusion, the court is called upon to lay down
rules that may be of vital ihterest to persons who may hereafter
be brought to trial. All such persons are entitled to be heard on
all questions affecting their rights, and it is a harsh rule that
would bind them by decisions made in what are practically "moot"
cases, where opposing views have not been presented" [our
italics].
The next consideration which makes important the granting
to the state of a method of testing the trial court procedure is
the demoralizing effect of the present method upon all parties
concerned with the trial. Most reputable lawyers avoid criminal
cases; most judges are anxious to get back to other phases of
trial work. Why is this true? Because they realize that the
emphasis of the present method is wrong and the scales of justice
are off balance. Much of the delay in trial work and many of
the obstructive tactics used are occasioned by this fact. A more
orderly, balanced procedure would result in a tremendous saving
in time and expense and in a more efficient administration of the
law. The check and supervision which state appeals would give,
would result in large measure in securing a more orderly, bal-
anced procedure.
By way of illustration let us consider the effect of present
methods on the various actors in a criminal prosecution. First
of all, the lawyers. Consider the multitudinous grounds upon
which appeals are taken by defendants. We grow righteously
indignant, as we read the decisions, to learn of the errors com-
mitted against them, and of the indignities practiced upon them
by the prosecuting attorney. Who does not know of inadmissible
evidence "lugged in" to prejudice the jury, of improper argu-
ments made by the prosecutor, of tricks and devices practiced by
68 People v. Niles, 300 Ill. 458, 133 N. E. 352 (1921).
69D. C. Ann. Code (1924) § 935, 31 Stat. 1341, c. 854, § 935, (1901)
U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 1227.
70 213 U. S. 297, 300, 29 Sup. Ct. 507, 508 (1908).
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him to gain the sympathy, or arouse the prejudice of the jury?
As a matter of fact, conceding all of his well-known limitations,
the one man in the court room who has best learned the danger
of indiscretion in manner and speech is the prosecuting attorney.
He is the one person whose actions are most frequently subject
to recordation and inspection and who is most frequently in-
formed by the supreme court as to just how he should behave.--
But he knows that his only chance of successful prosecution is
in the trial court. He knows that his sardonic opponent across
the room, violating with impunity practically every rule of prac-
tice, and goading him deliberately into error, holds a whip hand
against which it is almost impossible for him to compete. He
knows that a record is being made of his words and actions upon
which he may later be taken to task, but that he can make no
record of the words or actions of the attorney for the defense
which will serve any purpose.
Occasionally, even the trial judge,7" the jury and the other
court officers,73 come in for advice and admonition. The one
man who seems to be most privileged is the attorney for the
defense. The recorded cases do not reveal his actions or speech
except incidentally and by way of occasional justification or ex-
cuse for the prosecuting attorney.7 The reason is that the ac-
tions and speech of the attorney for the defense are not subject
to review.75 If the state's attorney asks improper questions or
-' See collections of cases in Am. Dig. Decennial, CrInz. Laze, § 699 et scq.;
14 Cent. Dig., Crim. Law, § 1655 et scq.; (1925) 35 Yu. L,.W JOumi,%L,
105.72 Adler v. United States, 182 Fed. 4G4 (C. C. A. 5th, 1910); State v.
Roby, 128 Mlinn. 187, 150 N. W. 793 (1915); People v. Becker, 210 N. Y.
274, 104 N. E. 396 (1914); Lewis v. State, 55 Fla. 54, 45 So. 93 (1903).
73 Lavalley v. State, 18 Wis. 68, 205 N. W. 412 (1925).
74State v. Giudice, 170 Iowa, 731, 153 N. W. 336 (1915); Irving v.
People, 43 Colo. 260, 95 Pac. 940 (1908); People v. Kiely, 230 Mich. 403,
203 N. W. 112 (1925); State v. Burns, 119 Iowa, 663, 94 N. W. 233 (1903);
Couch v. State, 6 Ala. App. 43, 60 So. 539 (1912); People v. Sliccovicb,
193 Calif. 544, 226 Pac. 611 (1924); Roberts v. State, C0 Tex. Cr. App.
111, 131 S. W. 321 (1910).
In State v. Raymond, 88 Conn. 148, 150, 89 Atl. 1118 (1914) appears
this comment: "In other respects mentioned, the attorney for the State was
also guilty of gross impropriety. The record shows on his part, and on
the part of the attorney opposed to him, a wilful disregard for the ruling3
and suggestions of the trial judge throughout the trial, and a similar diz-
regard for the rules of court and the proprieties of the occasion. As eoon
as it appeared that this misconduct was wilful and not inadvertent, the
trial judge should have admonished counsel that a repetition of it would
be followed by their suspension or displacement as attorney. If the
admonition was unheeded, such displacement or suspension should have
been ordered.'
75 The question presented is rather as to whether or not the defendant
has been prejudiced by the retaliatory remarks of the prosecuting attorney
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makes improper remarks, the defendant is prejudiced thereby
and a hard-earned conviction is lost. If the same type of ques-
tions are asked or remarks made by the attorney for the defense,
the state is not prejudiced and an acquittal so procured stands
as a final determination. In civil cases it is quite common to find
that misconduct of attorneys may constitute reversible error
whether committed on behalf of either plaintiff or defendant."9
In criminal cases, strange to say, while the attorney for the de-
fense may go so far as to put himself in contempt of court "
and subject himself to punishment, unless collusion on the part
of defendant be shown, the acquittal stands.
In jurisdictions such as Minnesota there is no way, following
an acquittal, in which the conduct of the attorney for the defense
can be brought to the attention of the appellate court. In fact,
the more extreme his conduct or the more flagrant the court's
error in ruling in the defendant's favor on matters of evidence or
procedure, the more probable becomes an acquittal. The jury
naturally gets the impression that the correct position is the one
taken by the attorney for the defense and supported by the court.
Sometimes the result is to distort the case out of all proportion
and to make the prosecuting witness practically a defendant,
harassed, browbeaten and unprotected, while the defendant sits
smugly, not required to testify, and his silence not a proper
subject of comment. Occasionally we find recognition of this
warped situation in the opinions of appellate courts. 8 I-ow-
ever, if there be an acquittal, the state has no appeal and the
appellate court never sees a record of the case.71 Those who are
or the disciplinary methods of the judge. See State v. Elder, 130 Wash.
612, 228 Pac. 1016 (1924) and see cases cited supra note 72.
76 (1924) 8 MINN. L. Rv. 438; Illinois Power Co. v. Lyon, 311 Ill.'123,
142 N. E. 456 (1924); Wrabek v. Suchomel, 145 Minn. 468, 177 N. W.
764 (1920).
77 Goodhart v. State, 84 Conn. 60, 78 Atl. 853 (1911); In re Cary, 206
I. W. 402 (Minn. 1925).
78 State v. Sloan, supra note 65.
79 M cCue v. State, 170 S. W. 280, 287 (Tex. Cr. App. 1914): "We always
regret to see such exhibitions of temper, and strained technical criticisms
of an opinion. . . . But it is sometimes insisted that we too often
hold that, while some slight error has crept into the record against the
defendant, yet it is not of that nature to necessitate a reversal of the case,
and these technical matters are never held against the state. Counsel
in their zeal forget that we never have an opportunity to so hold. The
state has no right of appeal, and no matter how erroneous a ruling of the
trial court may be against the state in regard to admitting or rejecting
testimony, the state cannot bring those questions to us for review On
appeal all we pass on is: Was there error committed against the defendant
on the trial of the case; and, if so, was it of the nature to harmfully
affect him? . . . As hereinbefore stated, counsel in their zeal forget
that only a defendant can appeal, and this court can and only does pass
on whether or not there has been error committed against him-has he,
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familiar with criminal court practice know and take for granted
the tremendous advantage which the defense has in this respect.
To the uninitiated, who make only casual contact with the crimi-
nal courts, the chicanery and shysterism of the defense attorney
is apt to be interpreted as evidence of great ability. The cautious
prosecutor, with the latest warning of the appellate court still
ringing in his ears, is apt to be regarded as a novice.CJ
As has been suggested before, the results of this situation
are far-reaching in their effect on the administration of the
criminal law. The situation is demoralizing upon the trial judge.
As a matter of practice and experience it can fairly be said that
some trial judges do undoubtedly and deliberately weigh the
scales in favor of the defendant. Such a judge kmows that if
he rules for the defendant on all doubtful points and gives every
instruction offered by him, he will be safe from reversal. If
the instructions so given result in an acquittal, the state has no
appeal and the matter ends there. If the jury convicts, then
the record is clear. Some trial judges very frankly tell their
prosecuting attorneys that they do not propose to take any
chances of being reversed by giving instructions favoring the
state on points disputed by counsel for the defendant. Some of
them give every instruction requested by the defendant, even
though the result be to state the same proposition of law and the
same suggestion for acquittal over several times, and to give the
jury an entirely false impression of the proper relative emphasis
to be placed upon particular points.
The result is, further, that trial judges become more and more
subject to local influence and local pressure in favor of the de-
fendant. Few persons are interested in urging the trial judge
to stand up squarely for law enforcement. Practically every
defendant, on the other hand, has friends in the church, in the
lodge, in the union, or in the social group who make it their
business to whisper their suggestions and intimations in favor of
leniency. The weak, spineless trial judge is able to hide his
weakness in a record upon which the state has no appeal and thus
to do the bidding of his friends. The strong, fearless judge ac-
quires the reputation of being "hardboiled," of "railroading men
to jail." If he rules on a disputed point in favor of the state and
is reversed, he is punished from day to day by covert innuendoes
and at election time by direct attack.
or not, had a fair and impartial trial? We have been led to make these
suggestions or remarks by the ill-timed expressions contained in the argu-
ments on file, and we are satisfied that counsel, when they coolly reflect
on the matter themselves, will admit that the use of the remarks and ex-
pressions was wholly unwarranted and out of place" [our italics].
so Ferrari, The Public Defender (1912) 2 Joua. o Car. LAi A-D Cniu.
704, 707.
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It is obvious that if the process were evened up by giving the
state the privilege of taking appeals, these practices could not
continue to thrive, so flourishingly at least. The spineless judge
would act fairly or be soon exposed. It is not hard to predict that
he would change his present methods. The strong judge would
find some measure of support for his fearlessness, some protec-
tion from the politicians who seek to manipulate judicial proc-
esses and from the shyster lawyers who now harass him.81
The present situation is demoralizing, too, from the point of
view of the police and other administrative officers. It is easy,
for instance, to criticize the police and the prosecutor for allow-
ing large numbers of cases to slip through their hands. They
test their cases, however, according to standards which have been
built up under the methods just described. If the police are
satisfied that their best efforts cannot produce cases sufficient
to satisfy the judges, why make arrests or why endeavor to de-
velop evidence? 82 If the prosecutor is convinced that he can-
not prove a particular case "beyond a reasonable doubt" under
the limitations which have been placed upon him, why should he
go to trial with it? He is equally severely criticized for "per-
secuting" defendants in cases which do not merit prosecution.
The writer would not contend that all of the difficulties men-
tioned in this discussion could be avoided by providing for appeals
by the state. However, it is submitted that very substantial
improvement could be obtained. When we contemplate the re-
puted failure of our administration of criminal justice we cannot
put our fingers on any one particular defect and say, here is the
reason for our failure. We know, or think we know, that many
guilty men are escaping: escaping detection, apprehension, con-
viction or punishment. It seems fair to assume that each one of
many defects is contributing to that result, and that only by
finding and remedying a number of them can we hope for sub-
stantial improvement. Most members of the legal profession are
willing to admit that the administration of criminal justice, as
a whole, is in need of improvement. Our greatest difficulty lies
in the unwillingness or inability of some of them to understand
that only by making changes in particular rules and practices,
each of which by itself may seem trifling or unnecessary, can we
improve the administration of the whole.
81 POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEvELAND, op. cit. supra not 50, at 603;
State v. Elder, supra note 75. And see supra note 81.
82 Waite, The Control of Crime (Feb. 1926) 137 ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 214.
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